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Abstract
Policy design undertakes to develop effective policies and hence must understand
whether and how effective policies can be formulated and implemented. However,
very often policy design has failed to focus on the causal chain that represents the
actual driver of policy effects and thus misconstrues the potential effectiveness of a
policy design. A mechanistic perspective is extremely helpful for conceptualising and
pinpointing such causal chains, as it focuses on the real processes that must be activated
by policy-makers in implementing policy designs. This article identifies the main steps to
be taken when adopting such a mechanistic approach to policy design.
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Introduction
In this paper, we reflect on the usefulness of adopting a mechanistic perspective for
the creation and analysis of policy designs. A mechanistic perspective focuses on
the ways the elements of a policy design can advance its goals, namely by better
understanding how the behaviour of both implementers and the targets of the
design are altered by policy instruments in order to better achieve desired policy
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outputs and outcomes. As is argued below, a mechanistic perspective can enhance
the technical design capacities of decision-makers by making it clear which behav-
iours are likely to be altered by any given policy intervention and why this expect-
ation is a reasonable one.
From a mechanistic perspective, policy solutions are comprised of policy instru-
ments whose adoption is expected to be conducive to a desired outcome, with a
policy design in turn composed of a mix of such tools expected to more or less
comprehensively attain a set of goals.
Policy-makers thus need a realistic causal theory about what occurs when policy
tools are deployed and how it occurs if they want to design something that will
actually happen more often than not, and to escape the trap of poorly conceived
and related tacit knowledge, experience and heuristics. To date, however, many
policy designs have been based on anecdotal or co-variational logics of expected
outcomes from instrument deployment, without necessarily understanding the pre-
cise mechanisms which cause these outcomes to occur. In a sense then, much
existing policy design thinking jumps from a proposed solution to an outcome,
bypassing the ‘black box’ of behavioural and organisational change and target
behaviour which generate outputs which allow this outcome to come to pass
(Astbury and Leeuw, 2010)
Too often in the field of policy design, as in policy sciences and public policy
more generally, explanations of ‘what works when’ are based on weak causation or
a ‘heuristic’ framework, an often acknowledged to be unrealistic set of assumptions
about irrational/rational behaviour, or a set of correlations between government
actions and outcomes which are often mistaken for causes. Or, they can be based
on a causation ‘derived,’ from ‘‘what works’’ approaches, based on counterfactual
estimates (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Heckman, 2005).
Overall, an actual focus on realistic causation is often absent. Thus, one of the
most important questions for policy design remains highly problematic for policy
designers: how does a policy design encourage, constrain and otherwise structure
policy targets’ behaviour to achieve desired outcomes; and how can the box of
policy tools available to policy-makers be organised in an effective (implementable)
way to achieve desired behavioural changes?
A mechanistic approach to design addresses these issues but requires careful
reasoning both in terms of the kinds of processes and interactions that can be
activated by a policy instrument and how policy development can occur to help
these happen (Moynihan and Soss, 2014; Pierson, 1993, 2000a, 2000b; Schneider
and Sydney, 2009). Such a mechanistic perspective potentially not only reinforces
existing analyses and explanations of how design works, but it can also show how
the policy capacity of government can be strengthened. That is, a mechanistic
approach to policy design strengthens decision-makers’ analytical capacity by
making it clearer what should be analysed and why. This approach then allows
appropriate policy tools to be chosen to ‘fit the job’ and helps inform the calibra-
tion1of those tools to ensure their effectiveness.
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This article addresses this topic as follows. In the next section, we discuss
in more detail the problem of causation in the logic of policy design.
In ‘A mechanistic perspective for policy design’, we summarise current thinking
on the concept of mechanisms and present a mechanism-based approach to policy
design which distinguishes among three main elements of the mechanistic chain: the
activators, first-order mechanisms and second-order ones. In ‘Tools and mechan-
isms in policy design: Activating first- and second-order effects’ section, a detailed
discussion of first- and second-order mechanisms is presented.
The mission of contemporary policy design and the problem
of causation
Although policy design as a field of scholarly research has itself experienced highs
and lows in the last few decades, in the wake of prominent government failures
such as the global financial crisis, it is currently experiencing a promising resur-
gence (Howlett, 2011, 2014; Howlett and Lejano, 2013). This includes a wide range
of recent studies of design phenomenon in the policy world which have led to
efforts to better understand and codify the often tacit knowledge of formulation
processes and the policy target behaviour which occurs in response to government
tool deployment (Capano and Woo, 2018; Howlett, 2018; Howlett and Mukherjee,
2018; Peters, 2018; Peters et al., 2018)
The endeavour of policy design involves a deliberate commitment to altering
public policy by anticipating the possible effects of governmental decisions and
articulating specific courses of action that are expected to effectively achieve gov-
ernment goals (Dryzek, 1983). In general, any policy design has to address two
main issues: the political and the technical dimensions of policy-making and policy
formulation (Capano et al., 2016; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2017). The political
dimension refers to the institutional and partisan nature of the context in which
policies are decided, whereas the technical dimension refers to the knowledge-
driven capacities of the policy-makers with respect to their knowledge of the char-
acteristics of policy tools and their impact on policy target populations (Capano,
2018; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2017; Radaelli and Dunlop, 2013; Sidney, 2007).
Policy design can thus be considered a knowledge- and information-based activ-
ity through which, in a specific context, policy-makers and stakeholders try to
formulate solutions for collective problems (Alexander, 1982; Howlett, 2011).
Following Elster (1989) such an activity needs to specify the social ‘cogs and
wheels’ involved in the relationship between input and outcome, so that good
policy design is based on better understanding the mechanisms through which
design interventions lead to expected outcomes. Paraphrasing Weick (1989),
policy analysis should craft explicit hypotheses about the linkages between the
input (design choices) and the output, including especially the specification of the
process (the mechanistic causal chain) through which a policy design is expected to
lead to a specific outcome.
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Viewed from this perspective, policy design is a contemporary way to pursue the
historic mission of the policy sciences, that is to improve ‘the concrete content of
the information and the interpretations available to policy-makers’ as they go
about crafting policy decisions and programmes (Lasswell, 1951: 3). The hoped-
for outcome of better policy design, as seen by policy-makers as well as scholars, is
more effective policy (Peters et al., 2018).
In order to achieve this, the content of policy design should conform to the
characteristics of good decision-making, which according to Lasswell and Kaplan
(1950) holds that ‘decision making is forward looking, formulating alternative
courses of action extending into the future, and selecting among the alternatives
by expectations of how things will turn out’ (193). In anticipating future behaviour
and the impact of their actions upon it, decision-makers draw on their existing
knowledge, empirical evidence and external advice to strengthen their ability to
design efficient and effective policies (Bobrow, 2006; Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987;
Howlett and Rayner, 2017). Such experiential knowledge, however, is only some-
times accurate but often not, leading to a chequered history of both successful
and unsuccessful policy designs and of the application of design thinking to
policy-making.
That is, good policy design implies that policy-makers possess a proper ‘causal’
theory upon which possible solutions and mixes of policy tools can be based.
Due to the nature of this heuristic and experiential approach, existing analytical
efforts are often more successful at shedding light on what is needed for good policy
design in terms of best practices, than at explaining how good policy design works
in terms of the types of processes it can activate to achieve the expected outcomes.
According to Lasswell (1971), ‘knowledge of the decision process is achieved by
systematic, empirical studies of how policies are made and put into effect’ (1). This
position is still valid and suggests that a solid theory of causation is needed to order
and to explain policy dynamics and to understand, for example not only ‘what
works and why’ (Goertz and Mahoney, 2012; Heckman, 2005; Jarvis, 2011) but
also why a specific policy design, and indeed a specific policy instrument, might
‘work’ in one specific policy context but not in another.
Indeed, we know little about how different policy solutions trigger and drive the
achievement of desired outcomes or, to put it another way, what happens when
governments engage actors in the policy process and how that engagement operates
to result in certain kinds of behavioural modifications and outcomes rather than
others. This is the subject of a mechanistic theory of policy design as set out below.
A mechanistic perspective for policy design
A mechanistic view of policy behaviour is a promising basis for strengthening both
the explanatory and prescriptive commitment of policy design studies. Over the
past few decades, many social sciences have moved in a mechanistic direction as a
result of dissatisfaction with both legalistic and statistical explanations. Starting
with Elster (1989), studies have sought to apply mechanistic explanatory logic to
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both political science and sociology, for example including Abbott (2007), Gerring
(2007), Gross (2009), Hedström (2008), Hedström and Swedberg (1998), Mahoney
(2001), Mayntz (2004), Schmidt (2006), and Tilly (2001).
There is broad agreement in this literature that a mechanism, being ‘theoretical
propositions about causal tendencies’ (Hedström, 2005: 108) and thus middle range
theories (Mayntz, 2004; Pawson, 2000), are sets of entities and activities organised
to produce a regular series of changes from a beginning state to an end one
(Darden, 2006; Machamer et al., 2000). These mechanisms are constructs that
allow us to understand what really occurs inside the ‘black box’ of social processes,
including policy target behaviour.
A mechanism is a ‘causal structure that explains the empirical outcome’
(Bygstad et al., 2016: 83). These mechanisms differ from ‘intervening’ variables
because they are part of a different perception of causation than the correlation
logic commonly found in the field which defines ‘dependent’, ‘independent’ and
‘intervening’ variables (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998). Although in general diffi-
cult to observe directly, they indicate precisely how X actually produces Y under
specific conditions rather than simply chronicle the co-appearance of Y whenever X
is present.2
Thus, the adoption of a mechanistic perspective means theorising about the
‘system that produces outcomes through the interactions of a series of parts that
transmit causal forces from X to Y’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 176). Such mech-
anisms can span micro-level (individual) and macro-level (structural) phenomena
















Figure 1. The micro-meso-macro mechanistic process. Source: Adapted from Coleman
(1990) and Hedström and Swedberg (1998).
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Inspired by Coleman (1990) and Hedström and Swedberg (1998), a macro-
meso-micro dynamic can be distinguished in three general types of mechanisms
(see Figure 1): ‘situational’ mechanisms which (on the basis of existing structural
and environmental forces) constrain individuals’ actions or shape their beliefs,
‘action-formation’ mechanisms which link individual activities or behaviour to
individuals’ actions and ‘transformational’ mechanisms which generate intended
and unintended outcomes (meso-level). The persistence or institutionalisation of
the outcomes of transformative mechanisms then generates a new situation, in
which these ‘first-order’ and other ‘second-order’ mechanisms such as learning
and feedback again occur.
This view, common in sociology, however, assumes that there is no direct influ-
ence between the micro and the macro (emergent) levels (Bhaskar, 2008) and is
hence less useful in the policy realm where structural or system-level relationships
are also important. Hence we propose a mechanistic sequence for policy-making
composed of three components: ‘activators’, ‘first-order mechanisms’ and ‘second-
order mechanisms’.
‘Activators’ are not mechanisms, rather they are ‘events’ or activities which
trigger mechanisms, activating the first-order and second-ordermechanisms through
which the behaviour of individuals, groups and subsystems is altered in order to
achieve a specific outcome. From a policy design perspective, activators are policy
instruments through which decision-makers set up their policies to impact on the
reality they want to maintain or to change. These instruments, of course, can be
calibrated or tuned more precisely to attain government goals, for example when a
subsidy is adjusted upwards in the expectation that it will be utilised by more par-
ticipants and enhance compliance rates with government initiatives.
First-order mechanisms are those which are triggered by the tool’s application of
state resources in order to affect the behaviour of individuals, groups and structures
and can be applied in a specific fashion in order to achieve a specific outcome. In
the policy realm, these mechanisms exist at the individual level whereby actions like
the provision of subsidies are expected to change individual savings behaviour; at
the group level whereby, for example, the provision of tax credits for charitable
donations affects group membership and behaviour; and at the system or subsys-
tem level whereby adding or removing new actors and ideas, or reinforcing existing
ones, through activities such as creating authoritative policy advisory boards and
commissions, providing access to information and other kinds of tools, affects
system structure and behaviour. These different levels of mechanisms interact
with each other, as for example occurs when a tax credit for charities changes
individual behaviour, which can affect the group’s behaviour and, ultimately the
nature of a policy subsystem.
Second-order mechanisms are those which are used to inform the use of activa-
tors by observation of the reaction of individual, group and system behaviour to
the previous deployment of activators. In the policy realm, these second-order
mechanisms are those which promote reflexive governance and include various
kinds of activities such as policy learning, diffusion and transfer, both with respect
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to lessons learned about individual behaviour and collective or structural effects.
They also include counter-causal mechanisms (counter-mobilisation; negative
framing; resistance) that can impede expected outcomes from first-order tools
(Dunlop, 2017; Weaver, 2010).
Application to policy design
Figure 2 presents an elaboration of this arrangement. A mechanistic policy design
perspective is primarily interested in understanding what specific first- and second-
order mechanisms can be triggered by the deployment of policy tools to affect
actors’ behaviour in predictable directions and in what contexts. That is, first-
and second-order mechanisms work in a context that varies according to the
type of policy and which can affect the ability of tools to alter behaviour in
expected ways depending on factors such as resource availability, capacity, imple-
mentation barriers and counteracting pulls on individual, group and subsystem
activity and behaviour.
This mechanistic perspective helps us understand the various dimensions of
policy designs. The focus on ‘activators’, the design tools/choices through which
an intervention operates, for example, helps to distinguish between the content of
the design in terms of adopted policy tools or the strategy for an intervention and
the mechanisms that they are capable of activating. The focus on ‘first-order mech-
anisms’ in turn requires an awareness of the types of mechanisms that are activated
through policy design in order to address targets’ behaviour in such a way that
their related behaviour produces the expected outcome. And the focus on second-
order mechanisms helps us understand what occurs when a designed policy is
implemented and thus improves the understanding of how a better policy design
Figure 2. The mechanistic process from a policy design perspective.
Capano and Howlett 147
can be achieved. When a government decides to change how its education system
functions, for example, if it has the requisite capacity to do so, it can activate first-
order mechanisms, such as school competition or enhanced institutional account-
ability in order to improve the performance of schools, by activating second-order
mechanisms like learning which is expected to do the same, or in some combin-
ation. Introducing vouchers or a combination of choice and national testing, for
example, can activate competition and institutional accountability.
Tools and mechanisms in policy design: Activating
first- and second-order effects
When a mechanistic perspective is applied to policy design, the key questions are
how and why certain tools activate specific mechanisms? Below we deepen the
analysis of first- and second-order mechanisms in order to help understand this
relationship.
Activating first-order mechanisms
As set out in Figure 3, the mechanistic approach to policy-making and policy
dynamics centres around the idea that the use of policy tools activates certain
propensities on the part of policy actors leading to policy outputs resulting from










Figure 3. The behavioural expectations of policy design.
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outcomes. This is a process which involves complex causal chains centred around
existing policy behaviours and policy-making contexts, and policy interventions
which trigger – intentionally, consciously or not – policy mechanisms which affect-
ing ‘target’ behaviour, changing it in some new direction (Falleti and Lynch, 2009;
Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, 1998; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010).
The linkages between policy instrument invocation and behavioural or policy
change are very rich. As Figure 3 shows, a mechanistic process of behavioural
change involves at least four linkages, all of which are affected by contextual
aspects present at the exact moment at which instruments are invoked and mech-
anisms triggered. These are:
(1) the link between tools and the governing resources present at any moment in
time
(2) the link between resources and the mechanisms which tools activate
(3) the link between the mechanisms and the actual behavioural changes which
occurs post-activation and
(4) the link between changes in behaviour and changes in policy outputs and
outcomes.
This approach thus views policy-making as largely about affecting behavioural
changes in target populations, with policy instruments used as a means to influence
a shift from an existing behaviour (‘behaviour 1’) to a reformed or new one
(‘Behaviour 1A or 2’) (Balch, 1980), a shift which is moderated by the context in
which the tool is deployed and the manner in which the tool is calibrated.
Context is important because all four of these linkages – instrument choices,
mechanism activation, reception and impact – are susceptible to various barriers
and impediments linked to factors such as the number and type of targets, the
Design-Output Linkages and Contextual Factors
Figure 4. Examples of specific context-related mechanism constraints.
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availability (or not) of adequate resources or capacities on the part of state actors,
and the like (Howlett and Rayner, 2013a, 2013b). As Figure 4 shows, in general each
link in a mechanistic chain is affected by contextual factors which can serve to block
or make the linkages across the tools-output chain problematic, that is making a
design outcome more difficult to predict and control (Falleti and Lynch, 2009).
There are many such barriers and factors, which include such factors as the
preferred policy style and governance mode which can affect preferences for certain
tools over others; the various resource (‘Nodality’, ‘Authority’. ‘Treasure’ and
‘Organization’ or NATO (Hood, 1986)) endowments enjoyed by a government
which can limit its capability to use particular tools or how they are calibrated,
or eliminate them altogether (Wu et al., 2015); possible countervailing demands
and constraints on behavioural change which can undermine the effect and impact
of a mechanism on subsequent behavioural change (Howlett, 2018; Weaver, 2014,
2015); as well as various kinds of implementation and other issues which can lessen,
or enhance, policy outputs (Hupe and Hill, 2016; Lindqvist, 2019).
Moreover, different temporal dimensions, for example, also exist in these rela-
tionships such as the tempo, duration, time-frame, and timing of interventions and
responses (Adam, 2004). Some mechanistic causal chains need time to develop
(duration) an outcome and if the designers do not take this into account they
may design in a very ineffective way. And some mechanistic chains can have a
different timing with respect to other related or linked dynamics such as a low
synchronisation rate between first-order mechanism activation and second-order
learning or diffusion: this temporal misalignment can be the bearer of unexpected
outcomes with respect to designers’ goals. In other words, mechanisms can be
activated in different ways and induce expected behaviours in an intense way or
more loosely and at a slower pace.
Of course this discussion continues to beg the question of what is in the ‘black
box’ at the centre of the analysis. In the following section, we elaborate upon the
first- and second-order mechanisms which comprise that box.
Individual- and group-level behavioural mechanisms. First-order mechanisms are those
psychological and structural characteristics of policy actors which directly affect
their behaviour and reaction to policy cues. Although a great deal of the extant
policy literature deals with individual-level behaviour, these mechanisms exist not
only at the ‘individual’ level but also at the ‘group’ and ‘structural’ ones (Falleti
and Lynch, 2008).
Most of the literature on causal mechanisms in general, and dealing with policy
mechanisms in particular, has focussed on the individual level. At this level both
individual-level ‘micro’ mechanisms (affecting either ‘system 1’ unconscious or
semi-conscious psychological propensities) and ‘system 2’ conscious or more
‘rational’ ones compose a key set of mechanisms which many policy tools are
expected to activate (Kahneman, 2013).
Until recently, most studies focussed on so-called system 1 mechanisms, that is
those which appealed to the more rational bases of human cognition, such as the
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ability to accurately assess the costs and benefits of specific proposed courses of
action and decide upon a maximising or optimal strategy (Elster, 2009).
As Strassheim (this special issue) has observed, in recent years, under the sway of
behavioural economists and others, however, many works dealing with ‘system 2’
or automatic less ‘rational’ motivations and cognitive strategies have increasingly
been added to this design and policy-making lexicon (Ariely, 2010; Shafir, 2013;
Shafir et al., 1993; Sunstein et al., 2001). Examples of these are found in Figure 5.
In this view, at the individual level the mechanisms activated by policy instru-
ments in order to trigger policy change are characteristics of human behaviour such
as greed, fear, risk aversion, or the use of heuristics and other less rational ways of
thinking which affect the logics of calculation and appropriateness individuals take
towards such issues as whether or not to perform a crime or quit smoking or invest
in a pension fund or donate to a charity (March and Olsen, 2004).
These individual-level mechanisms are triggered or activated by ‘substantive’
policy instruments (Howlett, 2000) which are the typical kinds of policy tools dis-
cussed in the literature around economic incentives and disincentives such as the
provision of subsidies or the creation of regulatory regimes (Hood, 1986, 1995;
Salamon, 2002; Tupper and Doern, 1981). As Hood (1986) noted these tools rely
on a set of governing resources for their effectiveness, including ‘nodality’ (or
information), authority, treasure or the organisational resources of government
(Anderson, 1975) (see Table 1) which form an important part of their capacity
to induce behavioural responses and figure prominently in thinking around their
likely effectiveness on the ground.
Thus, information-based instruments, for example, can both facilitate the pro-
vision of information as well as suppress it and can involve the release of mislead-
ing as well as accurate information (Goodin, 1980) both of which can affect human
cognitive and emotional response mechanisms, for example, concerning whether
and how many supplies to stockpile in the face of a natural disaster or threat. These
Design-Output Linkages and Contextual Factors
Figure 5. Examples of individual- and group-level first-order mechanisms.
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tools can be calibrated or applied at different levels of intensity, affecting the degree
or speed to which a mechanism is activated.
One of the main reasons such tools might be deployed is supply oriented: that is
a government may utilise specific kinds of tools which deploy the kinds of resources
it has in ample supply or which could be easily replenished (Hood, 1983). But in
addition to ‘supply-side’ capacity issues, ‘demand-side’ considerations are also very
significant in such choices. That is, in general, each category of tool involves the use
of a specific governing resource expected to trigger or lever a specific characteristic
or receptor in a target, inducing a certain behavioural response. Thus, the effect-
iveness of the deployment of such tools is linked not just to resource availability – a
precondition of their use – but also to the existence of different ‘receptors’ on the
part of policy targets which make them respond in a predictable way to the use of
Table 2. Behavioural needs for resource effectiveness
Tool type Statecraft resource applied Target behavioural pre-requisite
Nodality Information Credibility/trust – willingness to believe and act
on information provided by government
Authority Coercive power/force Legitimacy – willingness to be manipulated by
government invoked penalties and
proscriptions
Treasure Financial Cupidity – willingness to be manipulated by gain/
losses imposed by governments
Organisation Organisation Competence – willingness to receive goods and
services from government and enter into
partnership arrangements
Source: Howlett (2011).
Table 1. A resource-based taxonomy of procedural and substantive policy instruments
(cells provide examples of instruments in each category)
Governing resource and target need





















Source: Adapted from Howlett (2000).
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this resource when deployed, and to the level of knowledge policy-makers have
concerning those propensities.
Table 2 presents a framework of the behavioural pre-requisites which governing
tools rely upon for the effect.
In the case of information use, for example, tool effectiveness relies both on the
availability of knowledge and reliable data and the means to distribute it
(‘resources’) and also upon the target’s belief in the accuracy of the messages
being purveyed, or their credibility (‘receptor’). Similarly, the effectiveness of the
use of authoritative tools depends not just upon the availability of coercive mech-
anisms and their enforcement, but also upon target perceptions of government
legitimacy or the firmness and justice of the use of force or its threat. Similarly,
the effective use of treasure resources depends not just on the availability of
government funding, but also on target group financial need and especially their
receptivity to government funding or their cupidity. Likewise, the effective use
of organisational tools depends both on the existence of personnel and other organ-
isational resource but also upon target group perceptions of government compe-
tence in the deployment and training of personnel to provide services and rules.
These are important considerations in policy design and especially in the calibra-
tion of policy tools, considerations which are highlighted by a mechanistic perspec-
tive. Thus, the use of authority-based tools such as laws and regulations, for example,
involves considerations of legitimacy on the part of targets and must not over-reach
or over-burden the extent of legitimacy which a government enjoys (Hanberger, 2003;
Suchman, 1995). If a policy measure does so it most assuredly will require much
monitoring and enforcement activity in order to be even minimally effective, involving
large administrative costs and burdens which may well undermine its own efficiency
and effectiveness considerations, as has occurred in the past in many countries in
areas such as marijuana or alcohol prohibition (Issalys, 2005). The exact manner in
which a tool is calibrated is affected by a variety of implementation issues, ranging
from the level of resources available to governments – such as the nature of financial
constraints upon subsidy levels – as well as their knowledge of the degree to which
different levels of resource use affect the intensity of mechanism activation.
Group-level mechanisms. Although often pitched purely at the level of individuals,
many of these same mechanisms also operate at the more collective or group level
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1980; Olson, 1965; Riker, 1986) (see also Figure 5). That
is, this same basic logic can be applied to groups or collections of individuals who
enter into coalitions or act independently in order to pursue collective aims and
goals including to influence the behaviour of government towards them.
Such groups are sometimes viewed as mere aggregates of individual preferences
with no interests or aims beyond those of their members (Olson, 1965) although
more careful study has shown many more complex motivations and proclivities exist
at the collective or organisational level which are not reducible in such a fashion
(Halpin and Binderkrantz, 2011). These mechanisms include the propensities of
groups to search for new issues or retain existing issue orientations, whether they
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prefer to specialise or generalise in issue orientations and the nature of their mem-
bership appeals (Halpin et al., 2018; Nownes and Neeley, 1996).
Structural or subsystem-level mechanisms. A third set of mechanisms is that which
concerns the structure of policy subsystems and how they change. This set of
mechanisms is quite different from the individual- or group-level ones, which are
the typical subjects of mechanistic analysis.
This third set of mechanisms is activated by policy tools, especially ‘procedural’
ones which affect the manner in which individual and groups act and interact in
attempting to affect policy outcomes (Howlett, 2000, 2011). A sizeable literature in
the policy sciences has noted the importance to policy outputs and processes of two
aspects of subsystem structure, namely the number of types of actor arrayed in a
subsystem or network, and especially their ability to block off or close off entry of
new types of actor, as well as the nature of the ideas which circulate within such
subsystems.
That is, changes in the ends of policies, be they conceptual or practical, require
new ideas to be incorporated into policy-making processes (Blyth, 1997; Campbell,
1998; Hall, 1993; Sabatier, 1999), meaning such ideas have to be able to penetrate
into the policy communities and networks which control or dominate policy dis-
courses. Similarly, another sizeable body of policy research links changes in the
conceptual aspects of policy-making simply to the ability of actors in policy sub-
systems to achieve and retain ‘monopoly’ or hegemonic status within them
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Hoberg, 1996; Jacobsen 1995; Pontusson, 1995).
Like any kind of networks, policy subsystems are composed of nodes and links.
Manipulating nodes and links – adding, subtracting and changing them – thus
constitutes a set of triggers which activate a variety of mechanisms at this network
level including the willingness of policy actors to enter into relationships with other,
proximate, actors in the network (rather than more distant ones) or their desire to
act as leaders, entrepreneurs or brokers, between other actors and governments.
Structural Instrument-Output Linkages and Important Contextual Factors
Figure 6. Links in the design chain – structural level.
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Hence there is a third major type of policy behaviour, with a specific set of
mechanisms, which policy-makers can, and do, activate, which are structural
ones (see Figure 6).
Second-order mechanisms: The family of policy feedback
All of the abovementioned mechanisms are ‘first-order’ ones which directly affect
actor or system behaviour. But there are also policy mechanisms activated by
policy designs which do not directly produce effects at the aggregate level but
rather involve feedback processes affecting further tool choices and policy efforts.
These effects require the activation of other types of mechanisms, which can be
defined as ‘second-order’ mechanisms.
Policy feedback, for example, is a temporal concept that specifies a diachronic
process through which an outcome is reached in terms of its effects on a policy
equilibrium (Béland, 2010). Classic works in the field of political science have dis-
cussed these effects. Schattschneider (1935), for example, underlined how processes
of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation characterise much policy-making. In
recent years, however, the concept of policy feedback has acquired a more specific
theoretical role to explain general patterns of policy stability and change
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993).
Policy feedback processes can be either positive (reinforcing existing behaviours)
or negative (altering them). Positive policy feedback effects often develop lock-in
effects over time through an increasing return mechanism that both freezes the
elements of a specific policy and stabilises them on a specific path to be followed
(North, 1990; Pierson, 2004). Thus, they can be considered self-reinforcing.
Negative feedback avoids the expected outcomes and can advance self-undermin-
ing policy reform and change processes (Weaver, 2010).
Policy feedback is an inclusive concept that contains all of those factors through
which the effects of the previous policy design are channelled towards influencing
both policy and political development. This means that policy feedback itself
cannot be considered a mechanism, although it clearly requires mechanisms to
deliver its ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effects. Thus, from a mechanistic perspective,
policy feedback-based mechanisms should be considered a ‘family’ of second-
order mechanisms that cause future political and policy developments. Then, for
example, if a new design activates those mechanisms that – consistent with the
pursued goals – needed to be activated, positive second-order mechanisms can be
activated to reinforce the process and re-produce the expected outcome over time.
If the new design is not well suited for the task, then negative second-order mech-
anisms can be activated, and the situation t2 (see Figure 2) will be characterised by
a negative outcome that is contrary to the designers’ expectations but can also lead
to policy change and re-design.
For example, in higher education policy, the introduction of national
research standards to measure the quality of university research is a design inter-
vention through which policy-makers pursue improvements in research quality
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by activating the mechanism of institutional competition. This mechanism
is supposed to be quite strong and a significant amount of public funding is
allocated through this type of exercise. Theoretically, positive feedback would
imply that through competition, the overall national quality of research should
increase in the medium run and consequently through a variety of second-order
mechanisms, such as learning or blame avoidance, institutions should act
as expected and thus contribute to a self-reinforcing policy (Schneider and
Ingram, 1997).
Negative second-order mechanisms are activated as ‘consequences of policy that
tend to undermine rather than reinforce the political, fiscal, or social sustainability
of a particular set of policies’ (Weaver, 2010: 137). Therefore, negative second-
order mechanisms are activated in the medium-long run and produce negative
policy feedback, as indicated by a large body of literature in the field of compara-
tive public policy, especially with respect to health and welfare (Bonoli and Palier,
2007; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Fernández and Jaime-Castillo, 2013; Hacker, 2004,
2010; Starr, 2011; Weaver, 2010). This type of negative policy feedback effect can
be attributed to self-undermining dynamics that can be explained through second-
order mechanisms such as increasing costs/emergent losses, counter-mobilisation,
shifts in ideas and discourses, emergent losses, losses in mass cognition and menu
expansion (Jacobs and Weaver, 2015).
Applying a mechanistic logic to policy design: The content
of the special issue
When focusing on a mechanistic approach to policy design, different and intriguing
theoretical and empirical research streams are open. The content of this special
issue offers only a small sample of the richness of this analytical approach.
First, Jeroen Van der Heijden, Johanna Kuhlmann, Evert Lindquist and Adam
Wellstead in their review of five selected theories of the policy process underline
that that there has been limited application of causal mechanisms, and suggest that
further research informed by causal-mechanism approaches could point to a
new generation of inquiry across different policy process theoretical frameworks.
They show how a mechanistic perspective not only can improve the causal rele-
vance of these frameworks but can represent a bridge among them.
Holger Strassheim deals with behavioural approaches to policy design by adopt-
ing a mechanistic perspective in analysing the real impact of ‘nudges’ in terms of
success or failure of policy design. All in all, he shows how the lack of consideration
of second-order mechanisms can be considered one of the main causes of failure of
behavioural instruments.
Caner Bakir then presents an empirical test of applying a mechanistic
approach to policy design. He focuses on mainly structural-level macropruden-
tial instruments in financial policies and shows that they are effective when they
are capable of triggering causal mechanisms which operate within the appropri-
ate contexts.
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All in all, many lessons emerge from these applications of the proposed mech-
anistic approach to policy design. By focusing on the underlying mechanisms,
policy design can be explanatory without the need for overreaching theories
while providing a deeper understanding in terms of answers to why and how ques-
tions rather than the simple establishment of correlations. A mechanistic approach
can help policy design open the ‘black box’ of policy behaviour and compliance
and intervene in it. From this point of view, a mechanistic approach to policy
design can facilitate both generalisation and prediction and thus the better
design of more effective policies.
Indeed, such a mechanistic approach is needed in order for policy design to be
more ‘realistic’ and more effective from both the explanatory, theoretical and
applied, practical, point of view.
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Notes
1. Calibration is the process of designing policy tools in order to achieve the expected goals.
Calibration can be measured according to different criteria: restrictiveness, directness,
automaticity, visibility, density, intensity, explicitness (Thomann, 2018). Through cali-
bration policy-makers try to address the behaviour of the target by choosing the proper
instruments according to the context.
2. It should be clarified that in the sequence X!Y, neither X nor Y nor the causal relation-
ship itself is a causal mechanism. The mechanism is rather the specific process, the means,
and the activities by which X causes Y to occur. Thus, the mechanism is something that X
triggers which leads to Y occurring, that ‘generates’ the observed relationship between X
andY. Aswe shall see, in the policy world this relationship is of great interest from a policy-
design perspective, as it implies that the deployment of policy tools (‘X’) triggers a mech-
anisms (M1) which can alter a response in policy targets (‘T’) (by substituting or reducing
the causal effect of the situational mechanism T0), which alters their behaviour in the
direction of ‘Y1’ rather than the previous ‘Y’. All in all, this way to conceptualise mech-
anisms is well represented by the so-called transmission mechanism of monetary policy,
where specific monetary policy decisions are channelled into changes in real GDP and
inflation. This process of transmission is due to the mechanistic process activated by mon-
etary policy decisions through which changes are expected to be induced in interest rates,
exchange rates, equity and real estate prices, bank lending and firm balance sheets with the
goal to impact on aggregated dimensions (aggregated demand, employment rate, etc.). On
this see the application of a mechanistic perspective to the design of monetary policy
offered by the paper of Caner Bakir in this special issue.
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